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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model of joint venture formation and performance
in the offshore petroleum leasing market. The model is designed to
explain the behavior of firms acting on the incentive to circumvent
competition via cooperative action. The analysis focuses on strategic
differences between admitting small versus large firms to a joint
venture group, the (in) feasibility of alternative distributions of
profits among the venture partners, and the competitive impact of the
joint venture on the outcome of the lease sale.
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ANTI-COMPETITIVE PATTERNS OF
JOINT BIDDING FOR OFFSHORE PETROLEUM LEASES
The Secretary of the Department of the Interior is empowered to confer
on private individuals and firms the right to explore for, develop, and
produce petroleum on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) of the United States.
Lease auctions are held periodically to allocate these rights in regions
of the OCS which hold particular geological promise. In almost every case
the method of auction used is sealed bonus bidding, wherein the party sub-
mitting the highest bid is declared the winner and is committed to pay the
government the full amount of the stated bid.
A typical lease sale includes numerous individual tracts. In the 36
lease sales held through the end of 1975, a total of 2,636 separate off-
shore tracts have been leased by the Secretary, in exchange for total bonus
payments exceeding $15.8 billion. (See Table 1). The total areal extent
of leased properties is approximately 19,400 square miles, the average size
of an individual tract being 7.4 square miles. The total number of bids
received in the 36 sales exceeds 9,000. Each bidder may bid on as many
tracts as it desires. Although fewer than four parties typically enter
the competition for an individual tract, many bidders actually participate
in each sale, scattering their bids widely among the offered tracts.
Joint bidding occurs whenever two or more independent parties form a
cooperative venture to acquire and develop offshore acreage. In recent
years more than half the total number of bids received by the Secretary
have been tendered jointly. The competitive impact of joint bidding is
a major concern of OCS leasing policy. The positive effects of joint
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF FEDERAL OCS LEASE SALES; 1954-1975*
Number of sales 36
Average number of tracts leased per sale 73
Average area of lease rights 7.36 sq. miles
Total bonus paid $15.88 billion
Average bonus paid per lease $ 6.02 million
Total number of bids 9,289
Average number of bidders per lease 3.5
Source: U.S. Geological Survey.
bidding, which are fairly well understood, provide the rationale for its
continued practice. Joint bidding is believed to help smaller firms over-
come substantial barriers to entry in the OCS market. Susan Wilcox finds
that joint bidding has been the predominant mode of entry since the incep-
tion of offshore leasing in 1954. Walter Mead points out that prohibitive
risk-bearing requirements, along with the influences of capital and tech-
nological barriers, have contributed to the formation of joint ventures.
Joint bidding clearly facilitates a more diversified resource portfolio
than could otherwise be attained by an individual firm. However, Darius
Gaskins and Barry Vann argue that many firms who join in are sufficiently
large and diversified to minimize this benefit. James Ramsey, on the
other hand, argues that the marginal portfolio position taken even by
large firms requires diversification. In addition to the direct portfolio
composition effect, formation of a joint venture enables the participants
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to diversify sources of information regarding the geologic and economic
potential of specific tracts. Douglass Klein demonstrates how the resulting
reduction in uncertainty regarding the tract's value may have a positive in-
fluence on the price paid to the seller.
The major concern regarding joint bidding is that it may restrict
competition among potential competitors, diminishing the total number
of bids received. As summarized by Jesse Markham:
... where joint bids are simply substituted for in-
dependent solo bids, they reduce the total number of
bids. That is, if all the participating firms bid
individually on a given tract in any event, joint
bids would simply be substituted for a larger number
of independent solo bids. If the resulting reduction
in total bids is substantial, competition may be ad-
versely affected.
This argument is correct as stated. However, its simplicity invites
further analysis of the competitive forces involved. First, we must
examine the proposition that joint bids simply displace a greater number
of potential bids. Second, we need to qualify the suggestion that the
basic impropriety of joint bidding derives from its facility to reduce
the total number of bids received. In fact, bid attrition is a sufficient,
but not necessary condition for the anti-competitive impact of joint
bidding. This point is clarified by a simple example.
Consider two firms which may bid on two tracts. We assume that in-
dividually each firm would bid on one of the two tracts— the choice of a
specific tract being left to the firm's discretion. Regardless of the
tract chosen, each firm bidding separately would suffer a 50% probability
of meeting the other in competition. Alternatively, the firms might pool
.
.
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their capital and bid jointly on both tracts, thereby circumventing the
threat of competition. In either event, the total number of bids tendered
is two. Apparently, it is the configuration or clustering of bids, rather
than their number, that is significantly influenced by the formation of
the joint venture. This distinction remains largely unnoticed in the de-
bate over joint bidding.
Markham was the first to test empirically the hypothesis that joint
bids displace a larger number of solo bids. Examining data from a 1968
lease sale, he finds no statistical support for this proposition. Elmer
Dougherty and John Lohrenz confirm this result in the light of data cover-
ing the entire history of offshore bidding: 1954-1976. Wilcox concurs
with this finding on the basis of 1954-1973 data, except as it relates to
the bidding activity of the eight largest oil companies. Overall, econo-
mists have been able to muster only very weak support in favor of the
anti-competitive effect.
The purpose of the present paper is to reexamine the theoretical
basis for the alleged anti-competitive influence, and to identify likely
patterns of joint bidding among firms that are motivated by the incentive
to circumvent inter- firm competition. To this end we develop a normative
model of joint venture formation and performance in an industry composed
of heterogeneous firms.
Wilcox rejects the null hypothesis that joint bids involving two or
more of the "major" companies do not reduce competition. However, the
statistical test employed is seriously biased in favor of rejection, as
demonstrated by Dougherty and Lohrenz.
.l
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To isolate the anti-competitive influence of joint bidding, the model
is constructed on the assumption that firms are risk-neutral and of
sufficient size (relative to tract value) to overcome the indivisibility
barrier to entry. Diversification and entry motives for joint bidding
are thereby ruled out. The only incentive for joint bidding is the
potential for reducing the number of anticipated competitors by
combining with the opposition. The reduction in number of anticipated
competitors to be faced by the venture group depends upon its size and
membership composition. In general, as the group encompasses additional
firms, its deleterious effect on potential competition is strengthened.
However, the cost of arranging the venture and implementing the joint
bid is also a function of group membership. Organizational costs are a
burden on participating firms and must be subtracted from the gains due
to cooperative action. The objective of each firm is to identify the
"optimal" group—that which offers it the highest net gain—and to see
that the venture is arranged.
Of course, the net gain to each firm depends on the distribution
of joint venture profit among its members. A natural rule would be for
members to share profits in proportion to their participatory working
interests. Even under this convention, however, what appears as an op-
timal group to one firm may not appear so to other prospective members
who find themselves facing different opportunities and/or circumstances.
A venture is feasible only if all prospective members agree that it is
in their interest to join. It must often happen that individual firms
are left to pursue second- and third-best alternatives because the ven-
tures they see as optimal are not feasible. To further complicate the
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picture, we note that ventures which appear infeasible on a working in-
terest basis (proportional distribution of profits), might be rendered
acceptable to all by the judicious use of side payments. In general, the
types of behavioral hypotheses we are able to shape regarding venture
formation will depend on the types of profit distribution schemes that
find use in the industry.
In the next two sections we investigate specific aspects of venture
formation and performance. In the first section our view is restricted
to ventures that are feasible under a "working interest" distribution
formula. Later the significance of over-riding side payments is discussed,
I. Venture Formation Without Side Payments
A. The Basic Model
Consider the sale of T petroleum tracts offered to an industry which
consists of J firms. Let J, of these be large firms of size S. , and J„
( J — J. ) be small firms of size S_. At this point the unit of size
is immaterial, S, and S„ may be taken as any uniform measure of the scale
of operations of the two types of firms.
For convenience we assume the tracts are indistinguishable; each
2
tract holds the same promise of future development and production. The
tracts are to be auctioned separately on the basis of sealed tenders.
Each firm may bid individually or by joint venture on whatever subset of
tracts it desires. We denote by L. the total number of bids tendered
J
2
The case of heterogeneous tracts is treated by James Smith,
chapter 6.
!
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by the j firm. The firm's working interest share in its i bid is
represented by s.. (0 < s.. < 1), for i = 1, .... L..jx - ji - j
A key assumption that will be maintained throughout is that the j
firm's bids collectively impute to it equity bidding interest in exactly
t. petroleum tracts, where t. is proportional to firm size:
L.
J
(1) E s = p • S = t , all j;
i=l J J J
... where p is the factor of proportionality.
This is indeed a strong assumption; however, it agrees in sprit with
the observed tendency of large firms to participate more actively in OCS
lease sales than do small firms. This tendency may be attributed, in
part, to imperfections in the market for OCS venture capital which limit
each firm's bidding activity to the extent of funds available internally
—
which we may roughly approximate as proportional to firm size. At a more
abstract level, we may think of condition (1) as describing the steady-
state behavior of an industry in which all firms are growing at the same
proportionate rate. As Kenneth Dam points out, the Interior Department study
which precipitated the partial ban on joint bidding among major oil com-
panies is predicated essentially on the steady-state hypothesis. The pre-
sent analysis is consistent in this respect with Interior's framework for
policy evaluation. Moreover, for most of our analysis, condition (1) is
3
The simple correlation between the scope of a firm's bidding ac-
tivity and the firm's size ranges from 0.55 to 0.84 in the five OCS sales
treated by Smith, chapter 4. The average correlation is 0.72.
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stronger than needed. What is required is that each firm's equity bid-
ding interest in petroleum resources be fixed independently of the pattern
of joint venture formation. There is no need for the equity interest to
be proportional to firm size.
The operational significance of condition (1) is that it fixes the
total number of bids placed by the industry, IC. To see this we write:
J
L
J
(2) K = E Is;
j=l i-1 J1
which, after substitution from Equation (1) becomes:
J
(3) K = l t. = J • t, + J • t_ .
1 j=i 3 1 i 2 2
Thus, the total number of bids tendered by the J firms is independent
of the pattern of joint bidding that arises among them. As a result, the
anti-competitive influence of joint bidding to be observed in this model
is restricted to the "placement" or clustering effect, and does not in-
volve the stronger hypothesis that each joint bid displaces multiple solo
bids. 4
4
To the extent that the total number of bids is diminished by joint
bidding, our analysis will understate the anti-competitive impact. How-
ever, if contrary to our assumption the practice of joint bidding does in-
fluence the extent of individual firms' fcidding activity, the effect would
appear more likely to be positive. At least two aspects of joint bidding
would encourage firms to extend their bidding interests: (1) economies of
pre-sale tract evaluation and information exchange among member firms, and
(2) diversification economies of joint bidding which render all properties
included in the sale more attractive than they otherwise would be. Both
factors would be expected to stimulate rather than inhibit individual firms'
participation in the lease sale. In this respect, the bias in our analysis,
if one exists, is on the side of overstating the anti-competitive impact of
joint bidding.
-
.-:.
.
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Because tracts are indistinguishable, the bids of each bidding unit
(be it an individual firm or a joint venture) are expected, a priori, to
be distributed randomly among the T tracts. An observer of the industry
would expect to see, on average, n bids per tract, where:
J -t + J -t
(4) n = -i—
±
2—L
c T
Similarly, a bidding party composed of m large, and m small firms would
expect to face n(m ,m„) competitors on each tract it pursues, where:
,«
, ,
(Jrmi ),t: i + (J2
-m
2
),t
2
(5) n(m ,m ) = .
T
Or, using Equation (4):
m «t.. + m„'t
2
(6) n(m ,m ) = n
c
T
The presence of each large firm within the group diminishes competition by
t./T firms; the presence of each small firm by t„/T.
The financial performance of the joint venture is related directly to
the adverse competitive impact reflected in Equation ( 6) . The expected
profitability of bidding against n competitors increases as n is diminished
through cooperative action. We can express the expected rent captured by
the venture group (m ,m ) with a bid in the amount B as:
(7) expected rent (B|m ,m
2
) - ER[B,n(m m )] .
By "expected rent" we mean the amount of economic rent captured by
the bidding party conditional on the bid being successful, multiplied by
the probability the bid will be successful.

-10-
The meaning of Equation (7) should be clear. The economic conse-
quences of a bid depend only on the amount of the bid and the number of
competitors against which it is matched. The composition of the bidding
group is important only as it influences the amount of the bid and the
number of competitors to be faced.
Throughout this paper we assume diminishing marginal benefits from
eliminating competition. On this assumption, Equation (7) takes the form
shown in Figure 1, below.
Figure 1; Expected Rent as a Function of Competition
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We show the form of the relationship between ER[B,n] and n, for
arbitrary B = B . We use the notation: ER[B,n|B=B] = ER[B_,n]. On intui-
tive grounds we might expect to observe increasing marginal benefits from
eliminating competition, in which case the figure would appear concave
with respect to the origin. As it happens, many, but certainly not all
of the results reported here are independent of the convexity assumption.
The alternative case is explored further by Smith, chapter 6.
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Using Equations (6) and (7), we may write:
Similarly:
& ™r„i , C 2 9ER
3m
2
ER [ B l mrm2 3
= "—
an
Thus, the advantage to bidding in larger groups depends both on the force
of competition (8ER/3n), and the relative scope of the bidding interests of
prospective group members (t /T and t /T).
To arrive finally at the net value of forming the group designated
(m ,m„), we deduct organizational and administrative costs of forming the
venture from the value determined in Equation (7). Such costs probably in-
crease at least in proportion to the number of participants, and may depend
on the breakdown of group membership between large and small firms. We de-
note the general form of the organizational cost function as:
(9) organizational cost C(m ,m„)
Combining Equations (7) and (9), we have the expected net profitability of
a bid in the amount B, placed by a group with membership (m ,m_)
:
(10) ir(B|m
1
,m
2
) = ERlB.nOn^n^)] - Cd^.m^ .
B. The Firm's Optimization Problem
Thus far we have done little more than develop some notation to des-
cribe the economics of a joint venture bid. We use this in the following
paragraphs to specify and solve the firm's optimization problem.
..
'
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The firm's objective is to select a set of bids which maximize its
expected net profit, subject to the constraint that it maintains equity
bidding interest in exactly t tracts. For an arbitrary firm this re-
quires the determination of the optimal number of bids, L; their amounts,
(B
,
..., 3 ); and the percentage working interest in each, (s , ..., s ),
1 L 1 L
Using Equation (10), the firm's objective function can be written:
L
(11) max: Z s • tt (B.jm ,m9 ) ;
i=l i 1 1 i 2i
with respect to: L, {s.}, {B.}, {m. }, {m„ } ;i l 1. 2
.
l l
L
subject to: £ s. = t .
i=l
X
The solution to this problem is found by first identifying the ven-
ture group
s
(ja. , m„), and bid amount, B , that maximize the net value
k * *
of a single bid; and then arranging L such bids, where L and s. are
determined simultaneously to satisfy:
*
L
*
I s. = t .
i=l
The determination of working interest shares, s,, is a matter of
indifference in the present model. Regardless of the 1firm's negotiated
share in the venture, we assume it is able to satisfy its demand for equity
oil by entering into the appropriate number of ventures. This result only
holds if organizational costs are allocated on the basis of working inter-
est shares. If some fixed level of organizational costs is incurred by
group members irrespective of their working interest shares, then the number
of joint ventures entered into will not be a matter of indifference. Each
firm will be induced to expand working interest shares to reduce the total
number of ventures entered. This incentive moves the partners toward a
negotiated, perhaps egalitarian solution, and reduces the randomness that
might otherwise characterize venture shares.
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In other words, the firm's course of action is to determine the parameters
of the "optimal" joint venture— (B |m.., m„)—and to continue forming
such ventures until its interest in bidding has been exhausted.
As a special case, assume that organizational costs are the same for
large and small firms, and that these costs are proportional to the total
number of firms in the group. The cost function becomes:
(12) c(m
1
,m
2
) = a • (m + m
2
> ,
. . .where "a" represents unit organizational cost.
In this event no "mixed" ventures will form. Large firms will object to
the inclusion of any small firms in their group because the unit cost of
eliminating competition from small firms is relatively high. It is always
cheaper to eliminate an equivalent degree of large firm competition. We
might say the "collusive efficiency" of small firms is relatively low.
Consequently, large firms will band together only with other large firms.
This compels small firms to associate only with their own kind. We call
groups composed exclusively of large firms "primary" groups, and groups
composed exclusively of small firms "secondary" groups.
Segregation of firms in primary and secondary groups does not depend
on the uniformity of organizational costs. It obtains for any cost dif-
ferential between large and small firms, so long as the group cost function
is additive:
(13) C(m ,m ) = a • m + a • m. .
It is easy to show that large firms exclude small firms whenever their or-
ganizational costs are smaller in proportion to firm size than that of
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small firms. That is, small firms are excluded if:
(14) a
1
/S
1
< a
2
/S
2
.
If the inequality in (14) is reversed, small firms will exclude large
firms, and segregation is upheld. The direction of the inequality ap-
pears reasonable as shown, so we continue on the assumption that small
firms are excluded.
What cost must a primary group pay in order to reduce the level of
competition from n , the competitive level, to n°? To achieve the re-
duction, m° large firms must join the group, where m° is determined im-
plicitly [using Equation (5)] by:
n° = n«,0) = n - m"«t,/T .
i ell
Solving fcr m° explicitly:
m
l
=
— *
(n
c
-
n }
'
If organizational cost per large firm is a [from Equation (13)], total
primary group cost is then:
T
(15) cost (a° I primary) = a, • m! = a, • —-— • (n - n°)
1 1 1 t c
To achieve the same level of competition, a secondary group must incur
costs:
rp
(16) cost (r c | secondary) = a„ • m* = a„ • —-— • (n - n°)
Z 4. i. fc_ C
g
When side payments are introduced (see the next section) small firms
will be permitted to compensate large firms for their (the small firms')
collusive inefficiency, and thereby "buy" their way into mixed ventures.
..
..
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Although it is not obvious from the figure, it is possible to show
that the number of firms in the optimal primary group exceeds the number
* *
in the secondary group, m.. > nu. The details of this are left aside.
The case where organizational costs increase more than proportionately
due to network diseconomies can be treated analogously. Segregation of
firms is maintained because it is still possible to replace smaller firms
with their more efficient counterparts without increasing the organizational
complexity. The organizational cost functions [e.g., cost (n|primary)j be-
come concave in n, but the primary group's curve remains the flatter of the
two. The primary group would again face less competition and earn a larger
9
return.
C. Legal Impediments to Venture Formation
The threat of anti-trust litigation acts as an impediment to the
formation of joint ventures that we have not yet discussed. This influ-
ence can be introduced in several ways. The most convenient approach is
to add implicit "anti-trust costs" to the organizational costs of forming
joint ventures. Such costs might reflect the risk of fines, litigation
expenses, or simply the loss of goodwill that is suffered by the group
membership. We proceed on the assumption that firms perceive these
hazards, and confine their activity to those ventures which promise the
highest net returns, inclusive of anti-trust penalties.
9
See Smith, chapter 5.
...
•
'
-
.-..•..:
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Thus, to achieve any given level of competition, the costs of the
primary group are a constant fraction of secondary group costs. Organiza-
tional costs for both groups decrease linearly in n°. This situation is
charted in Figure 2, below. By inspection, the optimal primary group con-
* *
sists of m
1
large firr.s and faces n anticipated competitors. The op-
*
timal secondary group faces more competition, indicated by n„. Because
large firms are more efficient at eliminating competition, their profits
are larger: tt. = (ER. - C» ) , compared to ir 2 = (ER2 - C„)
.
Figure 2; Economics of Primary and Secondary Ventures
expected number of competitors
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One possibility is that members of each venture perceive the anti-
trust penalty as a fixed charge per unit of competition eliminated by the
venture. A secondary group of m firms (which eliminates m«t /T - 1 com-
petitors) incurs a lower penalty than a primary group of m firms (which
eliminates m*t /T - 1 competitors). A firm tendering a solo bid incurs
no anti-trust penalty. Using Equations (4), (9), (15), and (16), we can
write the revised organizational cost function as:
(17) cost (n | primary) = C((n - n)'T/t1 ,0) + z» (n - n - 1)
cost (n | secondary) = C((n - n)«T/t2 ,0) + z* (n - n - 1)
... where z = the unit anti-trust penalty.
We see that at each point, n, the two cost curves are displaced up-
ward by the same amount. The slope of each curve is incremented uniformly
by the factor (-z) . The new situation is illustrated in Figure 3, below.
The dotted lines represent the firms' position if they disregard anti-
trust and public goodwill factors. The solid lines reflect the internal-
ization of these costs, according to Equation (17). Evidently the threat
of a penalty mitigates the anti-competitive influence of joint bidding.
Both primary and secondary groups reduce their membership in order to
foster additional competition. The degree of adjustment depends upon the
size of the penalty. As the diagram is drawn, it would take a sizeable
penalty to discourage joint ventures entirely. It is interesting to note
that despite the anti-trust penalty, the primary group retains collusive
efficiency over the secondary group, and faces fewer anticipated competi-
tors. In order to put small and large firms on an even competitive basis
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Figure 3: Impact of Anti-Trust Penalties on Venture Formation
expected number of competitors
it vould be necessary to penalize them at differential rates. In terms of
effective puMic policy, this means that anti-trust litigation should be
dictated not solely by tha degree of anti-compatitive impact, but also by
the identities of offending parties.
D. Market Outcomes and Bid Clustering
In this section we explore the impact of venture formation on the out-
come of the lease saie. Specifically, market bidding patterns are related
to the extent of joint bidding among individual firms.
We retain he notation that m.. large firms make up each primary
group participating in the lease sale, and m„ small firms make up each
secondary group. It is immaterial whether these group sizes are determined
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by the profit maximizing criterion described earlier (yielding m.. and nu)
,
or by some other criterion. Since the industry is comprised of J large and
J„ small firms, we have the following:
number of distinct primary groups = J fm. ;
(18)
number of distinct secondary groups = J2/m2
Therefore, the total number of distinct bidding parties which participate
in the lease sale equals J-j/nu + J
?
/m„.
In order to satisfy member firms' objectives regarding resource ac-
quisition [condition (1)], each primary group must tender bids on exactly
m •t
1
of the T tracts included in the sale. Similarly, each secondary
group must bid on exactly m 't- tracts. Consequently, we have:
P
x
= prob
(19)
specific primary group
bids on generic tract
= nyt^T
>
,
specific secondary group
P
2 | bids on generic tract
I
= nyt
2
/T .
The number of "primary" bids received on the generic tract, denoted
x. , is then a Linoatial variate with probability distribution:
Throughout this section we assume that the firms align themselves in
stable and distinct groups of the indicated sizes. This assumption could be
relaxed to permit alternative forms of inter-venture mingling, with results
that are essentially unchanged.
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prob(x, primary bids) = V*i
1 x (X
l
• •
[
xl
J
T
j i
and expectation:
1 -
V'l
T-x,
E[x
x
] - Jl
,,:
l/T •
Similarly, the number of "secondary" bids received on the generic tract,
denoted x2 , is a binomial variate with probability distribution:
prob(x
2
secondary bids)
and expectation:
J
2
/m
2
m
2
-t
2
1 -
"2 -t2
T-x,
E[x
2
] = J
2
«t
2
/T .
The expected number of bids received in total (x x
1
+ x„) on a generic
tract is:
(20) EM •V'l
+ V^
The average number of bids per tract, E[x] is often taken as a measure
of the degree of competition in the lease sale. We can see immediately
from Equation (20), however, that the measure is entirely independent of the
pattern of joint bidding that arises within the industry. Its value would
be the same whether firms joined in a single bidding monopoly or bid com-
pletely independently of one another. Consequently, the usefulness of n as
a measure of competition is limited, as was made clear in the two-firm
illustration given earlier.
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The variance in the number of bidders per tract is not independent of
the pattern of venture formation. It is easy to show that the coefficient
of variation equals:
(n) std dev (x) m (1 )#(1.V!l)+ (1_V!i) .
E[x]
. 2
,t:
2 the share of total bids in
...
wnere r
2
- j .* + j , t the sale that are tendered
by secondary groups.
The variance in number of bidders per tract decreases as the degree of
joint bidding (measured by m and m ) increases. Moreover, we can expect
the coefficient of variation to decrease as the relative number of large
firms participating in the sale (J /J ) increases. This follows directly
from Equation (21) and the earlier result that m
?
< m.. (see page 16)
.
A more informative measure of competition is given by the average
number of bids per "active" tract, i.e., tracts receiving one or more bids.
It is this set of tracts that actually gets leased, and presumably the trans-
action price is related to the number of bidders which are involved. In the
appendix, we show that the expected number of bids (x) on a generic tract,
given that it is active, is given by:
(22) E[x active] = n
c
V t. Vl m -t. V ffi2
1 - [1 - J^A] • [1 - -^2]
The average number of bids on active tracts is necessarily greater
than n
, due to the likelihood that some of the T tracts included in the
c
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sale will be neglected. We see from Equation (22) that the degree of com-
petition on active tracts is determined by the extent of joint bidding
(m and m_). The function E[x| active] decreases monotonically in both
m and m_.
The expected fraction of tracts which are neglected can also be de-
termined as a function of the degree of joint bidding (see Appendix):
m,*t. 1 1 mo ,t: 9 2 2
(23) Effraction neglected] = [1 - -„ x ] • [1 - T ]
Hence, the expected fraction of neglected tracts diminishes as the degree
of joint bidding (m_ and m„) increases.
The influence of joint bidding on the outcome of the lease sale is
demonstrated by some illustrative calculations reported below. Figure 4
reflects an "industry" made up of 25 small, and 10 large firms. Three
different scenarios are presented, corresponding to low, medium, and high
industry interest in the sale. Under the "Low Interest" scenario, each
small firm is assumed to seek equity bidding interest in exactly 1% of the
acreage included in the sale; while each large firm seeks exactly 3%.
Under the "Medium Interest" scenario, these levels are doubled: small
firms seek 2%, and large firms 6% of the sale acreage. Under the "High
Interest" scenario, small firms seek 3%, and large firms 9% of the acreage.
For each scenario we have calculated and plotted the expected number of
bidders per active tract, the coefficient of variation in the number of
bidders, and the expected fraction of neglected tracts; based on the
formulas in Equations (21), (22), and (23). Figure 5 is entirely analogous,
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but the size of the industry is doubled, to include 50 small, and 20 large
firms. The extent of joint bidding is measured on the horizontal axes.
The sizes of primary and secondary bidding groups—which are assumed equal
in the illustration— are varied from 1 firm each (joint bidding prohibited)
to 10 firms.
The most noteworthy aspect of the figures is that the degree of com-
petition for active tracts is affected minimally by the extent of joint
bidding. The impact of venture formation is easily dominated by the
overall level of interest in the sale (represented by the alternative
scenarios). A more significant effect of joint bidding is to reduce ran-
dom deviations from the average level of competition. As we saw earlier,
venture formation induces a more uniform distribution of bids among
tracts, with less clustering.
These results suggest a non-traditional interpretation of venture
formation; joint bidding may permit firms to reduce their uncertainty
regarding the degree of competition to be expected in the sale, without
necessarily reducing its level.
II. Venture Formation With Side Payments
A. The Basic Model
To this point we have assumed that joint venture profits are dis-
tributed on the basis of working interest shares of member firms. On
this basis large and small firms are segregated in two non-interacting
classes. No small (large) firm is acceptable in a primary (secondary)
group due to the disproportionate organizational cost, measured relative
to the resulting diminution in competition.
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Figure 4: Impact of Joint Bidding—Small Industry
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Figure 5: Impact of Joint Bidding—Large Industry
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If we abandon the working interest distribution formula, size segre-
gation may not be the optimal course for industry to follow. For example,
consider a secondary group that invites the membership of a large firm.
By joining, the large firm would not help its cause directly; it could do
better (on a working interest basis) to combine with an equivalent number
of large firms. However, the position of the small firms would be ad-
vanced beyond the level attainable under segregation. Consequently, the
small firms would be able to "compensate" the large firm for its coopera-
tion. The question is whether the small firms' position is sufficiently
improved to enable them to fully compensate the large firm for its loss
of opportunity. If so, the small firms may be able to "buy" the coopera-
tion of the large firm, and a mixed venture will be formed.
If a side payment is successful in attracting one large firm to a
secondary group, perhaps more extensive interaction might also be in order.
We are able to show that this is so, and to identify some rather interest-
ing characteristics of the resulting mixed ventures. First we need to
extend our notation to encompass the mixed venture concept.
We define a group of class k as any joint venture in which large
firms constitute exactly k% of the membership, by number. For a group
represented by membership (m^m.), we must have k = m /(n^+n^). Thus, all
primary groups are of class k = 1. All secondary groups are of class
The remaining members of the diminished primary group may attempt
and succeed in outbidding the small firms for the cooperation of the ren-
egade. However, not all large firms can be offered more than their work-
ing interest in primary group profits, so some large firms will be avail-
able for renegade duty.
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k = 0. In the interval < k < 1, group membership obeys the relation-
ship:
(24) m
x
=
-j^ • m2 .
Next we compute the organizational cost of attaining a level of n°
competitors in a group of class k (0 < k < 1). Using Equations (5) and
(24), we have:
(25) n° = n (irT*2' m2 }
(J,—ArO't, + (Jn-ffl!)«tn1 l-k 2 1 2 2 2
Thus:
(26) n°-T = (^ * iZk^P't! + (J2-m°)-t2 .
Solving for m°, the number of small firms included in the group:
Jl'h + J2 >t:2 " n
°* T
T
(27) m! = -i-^ *—
?
= i (n -n°)
k k c
T=kh +t2 l=k* t l +t2
Total group membership is then:
(28) *• 4- m° = ^ + £-*} = <J# • ^
T-(n - n°)
c
k't^ + (l-k)-t
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(29) = -£- • (n - n°) ;\
. . . where t, is an index of the average size of
firms in the group of class k.
For given n°, the expression in Equation (29) takes its minimum value
for k = 1, That is, membership is minimal in groups of class k = 1 (primary
groups). Maximum membership occurs in groups of class k = (secondary
groups). On the assumption that organizational cost is an increasing function
of group membership, we conclude that the cost for a mixed group of arbitrary
class, k, to attain a level of n° competitors is bracketed by the costs ex-
perienced by primary and secondary groups. With organizational costs pro-
portional to group membership, we have [using Equations (15), (16), and (29)]:
( . T
cost (n c primary) = a • -— • (n - n°),
(30)
i T
cost (n° [class k) = a • — • (n - n°),
fck c
rp
cost (n° I secondary) = a • -— • (n - n°);
C
2
C
... where unit organizational costs are represented by "a".
The economic opportunities facing groups of class k are represented
in Figure 6, below. The organizational cost function is shown relative to
its two extremes, as in Equation (30). A group of class k may position
itself anywhere along its cost function (the middle ray) by expanding or
contracting its membership in the proportion:
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Am,
T=k " Am2
The optimal size for the group of class k is found, as shown, where the net
value of the group, it
,
is maximum. The convexity of the function ER[B,n(m ,mj]
assures that the optimal group of class k will face an intermediate level of
competition, n < n, < n_; and experience intermediate net earnings,
tt < tt < ir . Relaxing the linearity of the organizational cost function
would not alter these results.
Figure 6: Economics of a Class k Venture
ER[B,n(m
1
,m
2
)]
expected number of competitors
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The net value of greater and lesser integration can be determined by
rotating the cost function between its outer limits and plotting the posi-
tion of optimal groups of all classes, < k < 1. It is clear that net
earnings of the group decrease monotonically with the degree of small-firm
concentration. Whether a particular degree of integration is feasible
depends upon whether the small firms benefit sufficiently from integration
to fully compensate participating large firms. The conditions under which
this occurs are discussed next.
To simplify matters, we assume that the working interest shares of
12
similar firms in the mixed group of class k are identical. Thus, each
large firm holds a share s (k) , and each small firms holds a share s_(k).
Of course, these shares may vary for groups of different classes. Member-
ship of the mixed group is denoted [m (k) ,m (k) ] . We must impose the "adding
up" constraint:
(31) s
i
(k)-m
1
(k) + s
2
(k)-m
2
(k) = 1 ;
that is, the joint venture is wholly owned by the members of the group.
The opportunity cost of large firms' participation in the mixed
group is set by the profitability of the optimal primary group. In such
a group, each large firm would earn an amount = s (k)*^., on a working
interest basis. The opportunity cost of small firms' participation in
the mixed group is set by the profitability of the secondary group, where
each small firm earns an amount = s-(k)*ir_, on a working interest basis.
12Recall that up to now the working interest of each firm has been
a free variable.
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In order to form the mixad group, its profitability must be sufficient to
permit voluntary transfers from small firms in an amount that equals or
exceeds the opportunity cost of the large firms' participation. This
condition is satisfied if and only if:
(32) ir >_ s
1
(k)«m
1
(k)«Tr
1
+ s
2
(k)«m
2
(k) 'i^ .
If condition (32) can be satisfied for some value of k (the index of inte-
gration), subject to the constraint in Equation (31), only then may we
expect to observe the formation of mixed ventures.
The first important point is that condition (32) may be satisifed
for arbitrary k by taking s, (k) sufficiently small. In the limit, we could
set s (k) = 0, in which case condition (32) is reduced to: rr > u ,
-L K Z
which was shown to be true for all k > (see page 30). However, this
arrangement represents a rather special form of joint venture. Essentially,
the large firms are paid both to not bid against and not bid with the
small firms. The idea of such a transaction is not new. It suggests a
type of collusion in which joint venture members have "silent partners"
whose duty is to avoid bidd:liig on designated tracts. Naturally, each
silent partner would receive some consideration (side payment) for its
cooperation. Condition (32) demonstrates that this form of behavior is
viable, subject to the industry's code of ethics, with the large firms
playing the role of silent partner. The condition also shows that the
large firm might avoid this role by purchasing a very small share in
the secondary group. Although the appearance of collusion might be
lessened by this action, the rLntent and outcome differ in degree rather
than kind.
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A further conclusion from condition (32) is that as the working in-
terest share of participating large firms is increased, it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to form a viable mixed venture. If large firms
insist on playing an active role in the life of the venture (s ^0) , the
degree of viable integration becomes limited. To illustrate this effect,
we examine a special case in which the maximum viable working interest of
large firms is given by the equal-share solution: s (k) = s (k) , for all
values of k.
The special assumption needed to reach this conclusion is that the
value of bidding against n competitors—our function ER[B,n(m ,m.)]
—
varies as the square root of n:
2 .5
(33) ER[B,n(m m )|B] = " 3 + & -^(n-a)]' . for n g [0>n } _
2y
C
The exogenous parameters a, B, and y define the curvature and location of
the expected rent function, which would appear as the solid segment in
Figure 7.
Figure 7: Quadratic Expected Rent Function
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We again assume that organizational costs are proportional to total
group membership. These assumptions imply the following net profit function
for the optimal mixed venture of class k (see Appendix)
:
1 **
(34) ir.k 4y aT
To determine the maximal large firm working interest in a viable group of
class k, we substitute for it, in condition (32) using Equation (34) , and
solve for the value of s.. which assures strict equality. For all larger
values of s. , the condition would be violated, reflecting the small firms'
inability to satisfactorily compensate the large firms. As shown in the
Appendix, the maximal value of s is given by:
(35) s
1 n^ + m
2
»
... which obtains when all firms assume equal shares.
To summarize, the maximal share of each large firm is the reciprocal
of the total number of participants. No allocation with greater large firm
shares can be supported by side payments. In particular, ventures in which
working interests are proportional to firm size are excluded. Although this
specific result relies on the special assumptions of our example, the nature
of the result is not atypical. In general, large firms must adopt a rela-
tively low profile in mixed ventures if the small firms are to be able to
compensate them for participation. A direct relationship between firm size
and working interest is ruled out.
The empirical evidence in support of this proposition is especially
strong. In recent OCS sales, large firms almost universally assume a
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relatively low profile in the mixed ventures that have occurred. We can
measure this phenomenon in the following way.
For a given joint bid, we consider all possible pairings of member
firms. An individual pairing supports our hypothesis if the working in-
terest of the larger firm measured relative to its size is less than the
working interest of the smaller firm measured relative to its size. When
this result obtains we say the pairing conforms to a regressive pattern
of venture participation, with the larger firm taking a relatively small
interest. Conversely, if the relative working interest of the larger
firm exceeds that of the smaller firm, we say that the pairing conforms
to a progressive pattern of venture participation. The remaining possi-
bility is that the relative working interests of the two firms are equal,
in which case the pairing conforms to a proportionate pattern of venture
participation.
For nine recent OCS sales, all possible pairings of venture partners
13
which involve the firms included in our data base have beeen examined
and classified according to the above scheme. The results appear in Table
2. Over 90% of all pairings conform to the regressive pattern of venture
participation, as our theory of mixed ventures would suggest.
13 . ...
The data base consists of 101 firms which have participated in
recent OCS sales. This sample is not exhaustive, but includes all major
oil companies and a large number of smaller firms. A complete listing
of the firms is presented in Smith, Appendix C.
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TABLE 2
PATTERNS OF JOINT VENTURE PARTICIPATION
Number of Member Pairings which Conform to
Indicated Patterns of Venture Participation:
Sale Date Progressive
12/75 7
2/75 12
10/74 57
5/74 75
3/74 43
12/73 65
12/72 52
12/70 31
2/68 21
Total—All Sales 363
% of Total 7.3
B. Joint Venture Compromise
The question of inter-group negotiation and side payments has an
additional dimension not yet discussed. Recall that an optimal group
is characterized by its membership composition and by the amount of the
bid it will tender
—
(B,m. ,m.) . A firm would be quite dissatisfied
to form an optimal venture and have it bid other than the amount thought
Regressive Proportionate
183
253
601 18
456 7
513 2
535 12
1183
672
204
4600 39
92.0 0.8
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14
to maximize expected profits. Yet, the participants may disagree on
the amount of the optimal bid due to differences in their appraisal of the
tract and the competitive situation. An important question for research
is how such differences are resolved.
An obvious solution would be for dissenting members to leave the
group and tender individual bids consistent with their evaluations. How-
ever, it may be more rewarding for the dissenter to compromise its be-
liefs in order to remain with the group and retain the competitive
advantage of cooperative action.
If we view the joint venture bid as a negotiated quantity we must
ask which firms bear the burden of compromise. Within primary and sec-
ondary groups there is little at hand to guide our judgment on this.
However, within mixed groups it seems likely that large firms will
dominate group behavior. There are several ways to put the supporting
argument. Large firms, by virtue of size, have less to gain by the
formation of the group than do small firms. The alternative value of
bidding individually is higher for large firms than for small firms.
Consequently, the range of acceptable compromise will be smaller for
14 ...
We do not explore the selection of a particular bid amount here.
The factors which influence this choice depend upon the appraised valua-
tion of the petroleum resource and upon strategic factors related to the
context of the auction. The solution to this optimization problem is the
subject of a separate literature. See, for example, the studies by Keith
Brown; Michael Rothhopf (1969), (1977); Smith; and the recent bibliography
compiled by Robert Stark and Michael Rothhopf. It is sufficient for our
purpose to note that profitability of the venture's bid is related to the
amount tendered.
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the large firms; they would be driven from the group by lesser provoca-
tions. Apart from a greater propensity to leave the group, the large
firms are also likely to command greater bargaining strength due to
their greater contribution to the profitability of the group. Recall
that the presence of each large firm eliminates t../t- times as many
potential competitors as does the presence of each small firm. Conse-
quently, the threat value of large firm withdrawal is more significant
than that of small firms.
In light of the need to arbitrate disagreements which arise within
the venture group, concessions regarding the amount to be tendered consti-
tute a natural conveyance for the "side payments" which sustain the group,
Therefore, the discussion of side payments which has run throughout this
paper need not imply that the viability of mixed ventures rests on overt
monetary transfers. More subtle forms of accommodation and compromise
that are likely to arise among venture partners in any event may serve
this purpose equally well.
Conclusions
In this paper, our conception of the motive for joint bidding is
simple but germane. Firms are confronted with the opportunity to circum-
vent competition by combining with the opposition. The only restraint
on cooperative action is the cost of establishing and maintaining al-
liances. We have interpreted this constraint quite broadly to embrace
implicit anti-trust penalties and the loss of public goodwill. Each
firm's objective is to identify and attempt to initiate those particular
ventures which best advance its interests.
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The behavior patterns that are likely to emerge from this process are
complex. We can develop a coherent understanding of the outcome only
through abstraction—by focusng attention on the more significant aspects
of the situation. Under circumstances that conform reasonably well to the
reality of offshore lease auctions, joint bidding can be shown to have a
minimal impact on the degree of competition for tracts. The average number
of bidders per tract is unlikely to be influenced perceptibly by the oc-
currence of joint bidding. The major impact of joint bidding is to equal-
ize the degree of competition over all tracts offered in the sale. By
this we mean that joint bidding prevents the clustering of many bids on
just a few tracts while other tracts receive less attention. At the same
time, the fraction of offered tracts which are neglected entirely is re-
duced by the occurrence of joint bidding. In short, the effect of joint
bidding is to induce a more uniform pattern of competition in the lease
sale, rather than to reduce the average level of competition.
The model of venture formation also highlights the strategic differ-
ences between small- and large-firm participation in joint ventures. A
central difficulty in maintaining a venture group of heterogeneous mem-
bers (e.g., large and small firms) appears to lie in establishing a viable
distribution of joint venture profits. A distribution based on the working
interest shares of member firms is an obvious possibility, but we have
shown that alternative distributions, perhaps entailing some form of side
payments, may be prefarred. These side payments need not involve overt
monetary transfers among the venture partners, but rather might take the
form of fairly subtle operating or managerial concessions written into
the working agreement which defines and governs the group.
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APPENDIX
A. Market Outcomes and Bid Clustering
The expected number of bids (x) on a generic tract, given that it i:
active, is given by:
VW'i
E[x I active] = Z
x=0
(A.l)
To evaluate this expression v;e use
x • prob(x I active) .
(A. 2) prob(x | active) = prob (active [x) »prob(x)
prob (active)
prob(x)
prob (active) »
Also:
(A.3)
,
prob (active) = 1 - prob (not active)
for x > ;
for x = .
mn .tn Vm m-.t. Jl/ml
= 1 - [1 -
-V1] • [i - -V^
Substituting from Equation (A. 2) and (A.3) into (A.l), we have:
(A.4) E[xjactive] =
Equivalent ly:
VW'i
mn .tnVm m -t/l^l
i - [i -
-v^i • u - -M-i
Z x*prob(x).
(A.5) E[x|active] =
n
m,-t, J l
/m
l nvt. Vm2
1 - [1 -
-V1] • u - -V1]
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Equation (A. 5) corresponds to Equation (22) in the text.
To compute the expected fraction of neglected tracts, we first deter-
mine the probability that a generic tract receives no bids:
m -t m -t 1 1
(A.6) prob(no bids) = [1 - -^-^] • [1 - -^4
The probability that exactly t tracts out of T receive no bids is then the
binomial:
(A. 7) prob(t receive no bids)
t
V. J
t T—
t
• [prob(no bids)] • [1 - prob(no bids)]
The expected number of neglected tracts is then:
(A. 8) E [number neglected]
t T—
t
• [prob(no bids)] • [1 - prob(no bids)]E t
t=0 sts
- T • prob(no bids)
Finally, the expected fraction of neglected tracts is:
(A.9) E[fraction neglected] = Efnumbeyieglected] = prob(no bids)
m -t.
J
l
/m
l m -t.
J
2
/m
2
= [1 - Af^l • [1 -
-V1] ;
... vjhere we have substituted from Equation (A.6)
in Equation (A.9), which then corresponds to
Equation (23) in the text.
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B. Maximal Large-Firm Participation iu Mixed Ventures
We assume the expected rent (ER) captured by the optimal bid to be
related to the number of competitors, n, by the following:
(B.l) n - a - g»ER - y*ER
2
.
Equivalently
:
(B.2) ER(n) - -e+[3
2
-
2
4-r(n-a)r 5
.
We assume that organizational costs are proportional to the size of the
group. The cost to a group of class k of reducing the degree of competition
to the level n is then given by [see Equation (30) of text]
:
(B.3) cost(n| class k) = a«-—»(n -n)\ C
The optimal size of the group (and optimal degree of competition, n*) is
determined by equating the marginal costs and marginal gains of reducing
competition:
(B.4) -[g 2-4 Y (n*-a)j"°*
5
-
-gi- ER(n) = £- cost(n|k) = -*-T/tk .
Equivalently:
(B.5) [B
2
-4Y (n*-a)]'°*
5
= a-T/t^ .
*
Equation (B.5) can be solved explicitly for n :
(B.6) n* = a + [3
2
- (-^-) 2 ]/4Y .
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For convenience, we now assume that the expected rent function is
symmetric about the abscissa; i.e., 8=0. Equation (B.6) then becomes:
fck 2(B.7) n* = a - (_|-)^/4y .
Expected profitability of the optimal group is given by:
(B.8) tt = ER(n*) - cost (n* Ik)
k
Ck aT
Tyaf " t. (n
- n*)
c
' 2^f "
-TT * -f- t" " <"S->*/»]k k
,R qn _
£k
3
"c aTa k_
tB ' y;
" 2YaT
" t
fe
+
t
fc
4YaT *
Now, if the industry is one that would be competitive in the absence of
joint bidding, we must have n = a. That is, we require:
[-4y(n -a)]"
(B.10) ER(n
c
) - j^ = ° J
... which implies n = a, as stated.
c
Making this substitution in (B.9), the equation is reduced to:
(B.ll) Tr
k
-
—
^ _
4^T
_
4YaT .
This expression corresponds to Equation (34) in the text,
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Substituting this value of tt in Equation (32) of the text:
t t t
(B.12) -.— •—=— = s.*m,*-7 •—=— + s„*m..*- •-
4y aT "1 "1 4y aT "2 2 4y aT
We substitute again, using: s = (1-s _ •m, )/m
2
... from Equation (31);
and: m = m »(l-k)/k ... from Equation (24).
The resulting version of Equation (B.12) appears, after simplification:
(B.13) t
k
= s^nyt^ + (1-s -m )»t
2
Solving this equation for s yields:
,„ ,,, 1
t
k"
t
2 k 1-k(B.14) s. = • ——— = =
1 m
x
trt2 m± m2
Substituting for (l-k)/m„ from Equation (29), we have:
(B.15) s
1 m1+m2
-
... which corresponds to Equation (35) of the text.
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